This dam, set to be the largest in Africa in terms of power capacity, continues to cause disagreement between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt on filling and operation strategies. GIGA Focus No. It can help the riparian states outline principles, rights, and obligations for cooperative management of the resources of the Nile. Construction of the 6,000-megawatt, US $5 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) began . It provides clear benefits to all three riparian, such as flood control, reduced flood damages and sediment control. Although Egypt and Sudan are likely to resist efforts to include the other upstream riparians in the negotiations or to allow a regional organization, such as the NBI, to serve as an implementing organ, they must understand that the Nile River is a regional watercourse and its management must be approached from a regional perspective. Ethiopia should get its fair share of water that originates in Ethiopia. The Eastern Nile Basin comprises Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. All three countries have a vested interest in a properly operated dam. The instrument was a success in terms of cooling tensions between the states which seemed increasingly likely to come to blows. Ethiopias interests in developing its water resources are driven by its growing population and high demand for socio-economic development (Gebreluel, 2014). It too has legal arguments it could adduce in support of its position that the Dam is permitted under international law. Already, the United States has threatened to withhold development aid to Ethiopia if the conflict is not resolved and an agreement reached. The Tripartite National Council (TNC) was then established, consisting of members from each of the three countries with the aim of carrying through the IPoE's recommendations (Attia & Saleh, 2021). The Political Deadlock on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. An unsubscribe function is also at the bottom of every newsletter. In the absence of the application of the Watercourses Convention, various other legal arrangements and political declarations must be considered to gain an understanding of the regulation of the Dam and the Nile River more generally. Ultimately, all the water is allowed to pass downstream such that there is no net loss of flow (with the exception of water lost to evaporation). Ethiopia has never 'consumed' significant shares of the Nile's water so far, as its previous political and economic fragility in combination with a lack of external financial support, due to persistent Egyptian opposition to projects upstream, prevented it from implementing large-scale projects. The Nile is not a boundary-delimiting river, hence Ethiopia would almost certainly argue that the exception should not be applied here. Stratfor Worldview. Sign up for news on environment, conflict and cooperation. The US has revived diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute sparked by Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project on the Nile. It is perhaps the most glaring demonstration of environmental or climate injustice that the youngest continent (60 percent of the population is below the age of twenty-five) is also the one that has historically least contributed to the industrial emissions of greenhouse gases yet is likely the one that will be hardest affected by meteorological In turn, Egypt water policy and management should be changes or modified to overcome the great challenges. Also, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry later held the Egyptian side accountable for failure of these negotiations. This includes Sudan, another downstream nation that one might assume would oppose its construction. In fact, about 85 % of the overall Nile flow originates on Ethiopian territory (Swain, 2011). The first filling of the dam in July 2020 went uneventfully. The strategy and its surrounding narrative have attracted large influxes of foreign investment in the Ethiopian agrarian sector, with multi-million dollar leases of agricultural land to foreigners generally linked to irrigation projects planned in tandem with the construction of the dam. Over the years, Egypt has used its extensive diplomatic connections and the colonial-era 1929 and 1959 agreements to successfully prevent the construction of any major infrastructure projects on the tributaries of the Nile. The failure of the latest talks over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has intensified tensions between Ethiopia and downstream states Egypt and Sudan. Whittington, D. et al. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is a 6000 MW hydropower project on the Blue Nile, which the Ethiopian government plans to build to fulfill the country's energy needs. Could the Nile dispute be an opportunity to boost freshwater technology? In terms of putative new law, namely the Watercourses Convention and the DoP, the key principles of equitable utilisation and no significant harm seem to leave ample room to accommodate the construction of a dam for hydroelectric generation purposes. The Dam is used to generate electricity and went into partial operation in 2022. Ethiopia announced in April 2011 that it intends to build four large dams on the Nile, including one of the largest in the world, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (formerly known as Project X or the Grand Millennium Dam).This huge dam will flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, and create a reservoir that is nearly twice as large as Lake Tana . per year, that would constitute a drought, to push the three countries to adhere to their obligations in accordance with the rules of international law in order to reach a fair and balanced solution to the issue of the GERD, 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 1959 Agreement. Second came the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP) which concerned the Dam specifically (rather than the Nile more broadly). Maguid, M.A. Trilateral talks mediated by the United States and World Bank from November 2019 to February 2020 collapsed as Ethiopia rejected a binding agreement with Egypt and Sudan on the filling and operation of the GERD, which led to both downstream countries requesting intervention from the UN Security Council (UNSC) in May 2020 (Kandeel, 2020). The treaties also purported to give Egypt veto power over upstream projects. Egypt, Ethiopia to form joint committee on Renaissance Dam. However, the Convention took almost twenty years to enter into force (from 1997 to 2014) due to the lack of necessary ratifications by states. Still, if the exception was somehow activated, it would mean that Egypt remains entitled to 66% of the Nile River waters and that this figure should be used as the baseline for any future negotiations. 17th round of GERD tripartite talks hits wall in Cairo. As early as 1957, Ethiopian officials said that the Somalian economy could not survive on its own given how heavily dependent it was on Ethiopia. A regional framework for the management of the Nile already existsthe Nile Basin Initiative mentioned abovewhich is a partnership among the Nile riparian states that was launched in 1999. The unilateral decision taken by Ethiopia - which never recognised the 1959 agreement but had previously not been able to challenge it in fact - to build the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011 represents a major political challenge to the 1959 Agreement. Why the Nile could see a 'water war'. Similarly, both the final agreement between the riparian states for the allocation of the water and resources of the Nile should include a dispute resolution mechanism. - Ethiopia's massive. Another argument Egypt might adduce concerns the DoP. However, another trend stresses the need to approach the question from a broader and more holistic perspective. In an effort to forestall potential water conflicts such as the one brewing around the Dam, an increasing number of bilateral and multilateral water agreements have been concluded in recent decades. Such an understanding and appreciation of Egypts water vulnerability would help the riparians develop a water management protocol that can significantly enhance equitable and reasonable use while minimizing significant harm to downstream riparians. We do know that Ethiopia is already seeing longer droughts and worse floods. However, an agreement was still far from reach. A more recent trilateral meeting mediated by the African Union in mid-July, however, appeared to diffuse the situation with all three countries reaching a major common understanding towards achieving an agreement (Al Jazeera, 2020). One senior advisor to former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi alluded to it when he said that Ethiopia will supply the electricity, Sudan the food, and Egypt the money. To which we might add, and South Sudan will supply the oil.. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 79-110. (2017). Egypt relies on the river for as much as 90 percent of its freshwater and sees the new dam as an existential . On March 4, 1909, the Copyright Act of 1909 became law, making infringement of a copyright a federal crime for the first time. Typically, treaties contain provisions on the identification and function of the depositary, entry into force, adoption and so on (Article 24(4) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)). You must have JavaScript enabled to use this form. However, it also entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed (see alsoSecurity implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt). AFRICANGLOBE. per year, that would constitute a drought and, according to Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia would have to release some of the water in the dams reservoir to deal with the drought. The crucial leverage regarding Egypts water security lies with the Blue Nile countries Ethiopia and Sudan, as the Blue Nile is the main contributor to the Nile Rivers flow downstream. Concern has focused in particular on Lake Turkana, which derives 90 per cent of its water from the Omo River on which the Gilgel Gibe III Dam was built. Elliot Winter is a lecturer (assistant professor) in international law at Newcastle University in the United Kingdom. For Ethiopia, GERD is considered an economic game-changer. As mentioned above, Ethiopias dam-construction strategy is intimately linked with large-scale foreign investment in the agrarian sector and specifically in areas near the artificial reservoirs created by the dams. Both countries are concerned that without a clear and binding agreement with Ethiopia, the latter will have full control of the passage of water from the GERD during droughts, which would be devastating to the lives of millions in Egypt and Sudan. Ethiopia Needs the United States to Act as an Honest Broker in the Nile . It states in Principle III that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm. Tawfik, Rawia Discussion Paper 5/2015 . Thus, it is only through cooperation that Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the other riparians can peacefully resolve conflicts over the Nile and achieve the type of water use that will contribute significantly to regional economic and human development. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. As they consider this controversial issue, all 11 riparian countries should seek to improve relations among themselves beyond their relationship with the Nile, especially in mutually beneficial areas such as trade; educational and cultural exchanges; the management of natural resources, including water; dealing with threats to peace and security, including the suppression and prevention of terrorism and extremism; and confronting major challenges to economic growth and poverty alleviation, such as climate change, widespread illiteracy, and poor infrastructure. (2020). A general view of the Blue Nile river as it passes through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), near Guba in Ethiopia, on December 26, 2019. Test. Ethiopia says it will take a further four to six years to fill up the reservoir to its maximum flood season capacity of 74bcm. The Tendaho, Tekeze, and the Gibe series are only a few examples from that period. While the water will return to its normal state before reaching Egypt, the damage to these populations will be permanent. The disadvantages for Egypt and Sudan are the possibility of reduced river flow, although this is only really a problem during the years of filling the dam. Success on this endeavor will only occur under a legally binding regime that ensures mutually beneficial rights. The decisions that this group renders must be binding on all riparian states. As noted above, the instrument concedes for the first time that Ethiopia has legitimate interests over the Nile. The so-called Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd) is Africa's biggest hydroelectric project to date. These hydraulic mega-projects underscore the ambitious local and regional political aims of the Ethiopian ruling elites. The Washington Quarterly, 37(2), 25-37. l located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia . The piece (i) gives a brief history of the Dam; (ii) outlines the role of the Watercourses Convention; (iii) explains the significance of the Nile Waters Treaties; (iv) sets out the main legal arguments for Egypt and (v) provides the main legal arguments for Ethiopia. The 1902 Treaty did not preclude Ethiopia from undertaking works that might reduce, but not arrest, the flow of waters. It simultaneously expects that this role will change Ethiopias international status from a country perceived as poor and dependent on foreign aid to a regional power able to provide vital resources to its surrounding region. These countries should return to the NBIs Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was concluded in 2010, try to resolve the disagreements that caused Egypt and Sudan to decline to sign the CFA, and use it as a model for a future binding legal regime. A series of talks since then have largely failed to produce a consensus among the concerned countries, with tensions rising again after Ethiopia announced its intention to begin filling the dam in July 2020. Sudans agricultural and hydropower interests align with those of Ethiopia while it has a strong interest in not alienating its 'big brother' and northern neighbour, Egypt, with whom it shares a long and partly contested border (Whittington et al., 2014). The New Arab (2020b). Link, P.M. et al. It could be a treaty or merely a political declaration as the name implies. An Ethiopian national flag is seen at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Guba, Ethiopia, on February 19, 2022. l It is in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, about 15 km east of the border with Sudan. In 1964, the US Land Reclamation Bureau conducted a study for the Ethiopian government, identifying 33 hydraulic projects in the Blue Nile Basin. The drying up of this in Central Asia has been called the worlds worst environmental catastrophe. casting the DoP as a treaty) has the potential to abrogate the Nile Waters Treaties that Egypt holds so dear. In short, the Nile Waters Treaties do little to constrain Ethiopias ability to construct the Dam. This exception was implemented to mitigate the risk of decolonisation leading to boundary wars. Given the advancement of the dam construction - the GERD being, as of March 2015, 40% complete, according to Ethiopia - Egypt had good reason to reconsider its position (RANE, 2015). Cairo - U.S. Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Mike Hammer met with senior Egyptian government officials on July 25 to advance a diplomatic resolution on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that supports the water needs, economy, and livelihood of all Egyptians, Sudanese, and Ethiopians. On the surface, the 558 ft tall dam Africa's biggest hydropower project belies Ethiopia's financial muscle. However, this threatens the basin's long-term sustainability (as water use expands beyond what is environmentally feasible) and suboptimal in terms of capital allocation (as higher water use upstream may make downstream projects uneconomical (Swain, 2011). The Chinese then took over the funding amidst heightened international concern regarding the social, technical, and environmental repercussions of the Ethiopian dams. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will have negative impacts not only on Egypt but also on poor communities in Ethiopia as well as on its Nile Basin neighbours. In any event, the dispute remains. There has long been a conflict over water rights among the riparian countries of the Eastern Nile Basin (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia). Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2017. The politicisation of the Niles water and the utilisation of development projects to achieve political ends are not new phenomena. They generate electricity, store water for crop irrigation and help to prevent floods. In response, Ethiopia threatened military force to defend the dam and protect its interests (The New Arab, 2020a). This is on the basis of the principles of State succession as outlined in the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States (VCSS). In the modern era, the US used water to blackmail Egypt. Nile Basins GERD dispute creates risks for Egypt, Sudan, and beyond. "Today as you see behind me . For example, in 2017, the UNSC highlighted the security risks of water stress in the Lake Chad Basin Region, affecting Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, based on a combination of water scarcity, drought, desertification and land degradation. A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. Recently, the tensions among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile have escalated, particularly after Ethiopia announced that it had started filling the GERDs reservoir, an action contrary to Egypts mandate that the dam not be filled without a legally binding agreement over the equitable allocation of the Niles waters.